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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines how political institutions and electoral outcomes have affected the eco-
nomic reform process in the post-communist transition countries. Panel data estimations on 
annual data for 26 transition economies from 1992 to 2006 suggest that the institutional struc-
ture of the economy has been of importance, at least for the western-most transition countries. 
Democratisation and a relatively short exposure to communist rule have been conducive to 
economic reform, while the timing of elections and whether the government commands a ma-
jority in parliament appear to have been unimportant. Governments with right-wing ideology 
have implemented more market-economic reforms than governments with other ideologies. A 
high development level but also high inflation have proved conducive to reforms, while un-
employment has had the opposite effect. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signalled the beginning of a period historical importance 
for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which had hitherto been 
under communist rule. The breakdown of communism in the early 1990s and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia meant that a large number of countries 
came in a position to reform their political and economic systems. Almost all transition coun-
tries adopted - at least notionally - pluralistic political systems, elections contested by multiple 
parties and accountable government. The countries also engaged in economic reforms meant 
to restructure the hitherto centrally-planned economies and introduce market-based allocation 
of resources. In other words, the countries entered a phase of “simultaneous transition” of 
their political and economic systems. 
 
The economic reforms took different directions in different transition countries already at an 
early stage. The extent and the speed of reforms and the areas prioritised varied markedly 
across countries - in large part as a result of different choices made by the policymakers. The 
Central European and Baltic countries reformed their economies fast; their entry into the 
European Union in 2004 and 2007 confirmed their position as “mature” market economies. At 
the other end of the spectrum, several countries in Central Asia have undertaken few market 
reforms with the government retaining key roles in the economies. The rest of the transition 
countries are to be found between these extremes. The conflicts in the Caucasus and between 
the countries emanating from Yugoslavia held back economic reforms in many of these coun-
tries for several years. Economic reforms have also been piecemeal and subject to reversals in 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
From an early stage the differing economic reform paths across the transition countries elic-
ited attention from international organisations and academics alike (World Bank, 1996; de 
Melo et al., 1996, 2001). Based on earlier work on the determinants of economic reforms in 
developed and developing countries, four main sets of explanatory factors can be identified 
(Haggard & Webb, 1993): a) the economic starting point, b) the ongoing economic perform-
ance, c) the political and cultural starting point, and d) the political structures and processes.  
 
 3 
The prevailing economic structures and development level sets the boundaries for the eco-
nomic reform policies; the set of possible and reasonable reforms are likely to differ depend-
ent on the income level and the degree of state-control at the outset of reforms. The economic 
performance during the process of economic transformation will similarly delimit the space of 
reforms. The political starting point and ongoing political processes exert both direct and indi-
rect influences on the economic reform policies. We will discuss some of the theories explain-
ing or rationalising the links from economic and political factors to economic reforms in Sec-
tion 2. At this stage it suffices to underscore that many of the explanations of economic re-
forms are interrelated; the economic starting point may, for instance, affect the subsequent 
economic performance and possibly also the establishment of political structures. 
 
This paper takes an in-depth view on a broad range of political factors determining the extent 
of market-economic reforms in the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. In specific, we use panel data estimation for 26 transition countries in order to 
explain the extent of economic reforms undertaken each year during the period 1992-2006. 
We include a number of political and electoral variables capturing different political economy 
theories of economic reform, while controlling for the economic development level and per-
formance of the country. 
 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several respects. First, we include a large 
number of political variables and are thus able to give a more detailed characterisation of the 
political factors and their interplay affecting economic reforms. Second, we explicitly tests for 
the importance of electoral cycles on economic reforms in post-communist countries, which 
to our knowledge has not been undertaken before. Third, we are explicitly considering causal-
ity issues. We model, for instance, the reforms undertaken in a calendar year (and not the 
level accumulated over a longer period). We also seek to address possible endogeneity issues 
using GMM estimation methods for robustness checks. Fourth, the sample period is from 
1992 to 2006 and includes essentially the entire transition period. The relatively long sample 
allows us to divide the sample across different dimensions so as to examine the possible inter-
action of different factors.  
 
A number of interesting results emerge from our study concerning the importance of political 
factors on the economic reform process. First, we confirm the finding in other studies that 
democratisation has been conducive for economic reforms in the transition countries. Second, 
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the timing of both scheduled and midterm elections does not appear to have played a role for 
the economic reform process, i.e. political cycles in the economic reforms are absent in the 
transition countries. Third, governments dominated by right-wing governments have gener-
ally pursue more market-economic reforms than left-leaning governments. Fourth, whether or 
not the ruling government commands a majority in parliament appears unimportant. Finally, 
the longer a country has been exposed to communist rule (relative to the length of the post-
communist period) reduces the intensity of economic reforms. 
 
A number of the economic control variables have straightforward interpretations. For in-
stance, when the institutional and structural structure approaches best practice in western 
market-based economies, the reform intensity slows down. The richer or more economically 
developed countries have undertaken more reforms than less developed countries. Economic 
growth appears not to have had any effect on economic reforms, while unemployment has 
slowed reforms and inflation has led to an acceleration of reforms. 
 
The results summarised above apply to the full sample and are reasonably robust to the choice 
of estimation method. The findings are, however, most pronounced for the early part of the 
estimation period, i.e. in the early stages of the reform process when the variables exhibit 
most variability. Also, the results differ to some extent between the group of CIS countries 
and the other transition countries closer to Western Europe, suggesting somewhat different 
political economy mechanisms in the two regions. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses some theoretical and empiri-
cal analyses of the political economy of economic reform with particular emphasis on the 
transition countries. Section 3 explains our research design, data and data sources. Section 4 
presents the findings of the empirical analyses, including results based on sub-samples of the 
dataset. Finally, section 5 concludes the study and bring ups some unresolved issues. 
 
 
2. The political economy of economic reform  
 
This section provides a brief discussion of the political and economic factors influencing the 
policymaking in the realm of economic reforms. Economic reforms in the context of the post-
 5 
communist transition countries are usually thought of as the wide-ranging changes which can 
be made to the existing economic regulatory, institutional and structural organisation of the 
economy. Figure 1 is a diagrammatically exposition showing some of the factors affecting 
economic reforms. To avoid cluttering of the figure, a number of other possibly important 
factors such as external economic and political developments are left out. Moreover, only 
parts of the complex interactions between different factors are indicated.  
  
Figure 1: Factors affect the implementation of economic reforms 
Economic 
performance
Public’s socio-
economic preferences 
Political decision-
making process
Economic reforms
Economic structures 
and institutions
Political institutions 
and structure
 
Source: Own composition 
 
Starting from the bottom of Figure 1, the economic reforms are presumed to result from the 
political decision-making process. The composition of parliament, the government’s ideologi-
cal orientation and the everyday political wheeling and dealing are among the factors encom-
passing the political decision-making process. It is, in principle, important to distinguish be-
tween the reforms decided by the political decision-makers and the reforms actually imple-
mented. Lack of implementation capacity, time-lags from decision-making to implementation, 
corruption and various bureaucratic obstacles might lead to a discrepancy between the re-
forms decided by the policymakers and the reforms implemented.  
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It is reasonable to assume that the specific policy-making in the areas of regulatory, institu-
tional and structural reforms results from the at least four factors agglomerating in the politi-
cal process. First, the existing economic structures and institutions set the frame for economic 
reforms. Second, the economic performance may affect the “need” for reforms, but also the 
assessment of costs and benefits of reforms. Third, given the economic structure and perform-
ance, the population in different countries might have different preferences concerning market 
economic reform. The preferences may reflect societal and personal values, the socio-
economic characteristics of the population and the available information. Fourth, political 
institutions such as the electoral system will influence the political decision-making process. 
The dashed line indicates that economic reforms will affect the country’s economic structure 
and institutions, the economic performance and possibly also the preferences of the public. 
This feedback loop may evolve over a period of time.  
 
Figure 1 also highlights two (related) issues, which raise crucial challenges in econometric 
analyses of the political economy of economic reforms. First, there is a possible interdepend-
ence (correlation) between several of the factors affecting economic reform which may lead to 
multicollinearity problems, encumbering the identification of the separate effect of each fac-
tor. For instance, the economic structures and institutions delimit the reforms to be undertaken 
but also affect the current economic performance which again affect economic reforms. Sec-
ond, the mutual dependence between the explanatory variables may give rise to interaction 
effects. For instance, the level of democratic governance may affect how the public’s prefer-
ences concerning economic reform affect the actual policy-making.  
 
We will now turn to a brief review of the theoretical and empirical findings concerning a 
number of the factors affecting economic reforms. The main focus will be on empirical find-
ings for post-communist transition economies. It is, however, outside the scope of this paper 
to provide a comprehensive survey of the voluminous literature in political science, econom-
ics and sociology seeking to explain economic reforms. Haggard & Kaufman (1992) and 
Haggard & Webb (1993) provide overviews of and lessons from the literature mainly in the 
context of structural reforms in developing countries; Roland (2002) provides an overview of 
the literature with particular emphasis on the post-communist transition countries.  
 
As would be expected, the literature on the political economy of economic reforms is both 
theoretical and empirical. It can furthermore be divided into normative prescriptions and posi-
 7 
tive analyses (Roland 2002). The normative literature was particular plentiful in the beginning 
of the 1990s as the early reforms were implemented, and international organisations, local 
policy-makers and academics were searching for points of orientation in the transition proc-
ess. The normative literature has mainly focused on the political conditions for gaining and 
sustaining public support for economic reforms. Topics such as gradualism versus big-bang 
reforms and sequencing of reforms have featured prominently in this literature (Roland, 2002; 
Dewatripont & Roland, 1992; Kolodko 1999).  
 
The empirical literature focusing on political economy of reforms in the transition countries 
gained momentum with the publication of World Bank (1996) and the accompanying analyti-
cal paper (de Melo et al., 1996; later published as de Melo et al., 2001). Subsequently a large 
body of papers have examined the importance of various factors on the extent of economic 
reforms. Haggard & Webb (1993) point our four main sets of explanatory factors: a) the eco-
nomic starting point, b) the ongoing economic performance, c) the political and value-related 
starting point, and d) the political structures and processes.  
 
It is commonly found that an advantageous starting point at the beginning of the transition 
process has been conducive for economic reforms. Countries with higher income per capita 
and a less distorted economic structure have implemented more economic reforms than less 
advantaged countries (Roland, 2002; de Melo et al. 2001; Staehr, 2006). The economic per-
formance seems to affect economic policy-making in subtle patterns: Inflation is generally 
found to speed up economic reforms, while unemployment is frequently found to have the 
same effect although the empirical evidence is heterogeneous in the latter case. Taking the 
results at face value, the lesson might be that economic crises exhibited by high inflation and 
unemployment have made clear the need for change and thus been catalysts for economic 
reforms. The values and political norms varied markedly across the transition countries. It has 
been pointed out that the western-most transition countries traditionally have shared political 
and cultural values with Western Europe and that this has facilitated the adoption of Western 
economic structures and institutions (Roland, 2002). Finally, the political structures and proc-
esses have been of major importance. Fidrmuc (2003) and Staehr (2006) show that democrati-
sation has been an important factor behind economic reforms and that this is a causal linkage 
from democratisation to economic reforms. This may simply reflect that the electorate has had 
a wish for economic change and that democratic institutions have meant that the popular sup-
port for reforms was carried into the policy-making process (Hellman, 1998; Roland, 2002). 
 8 
A range of variables reflecting the specificities of the policymaking process are frequently 
found to be of importance.   
 
An important result from the empirical literature is that the political determinants of economic 
reforms vary markedly between the region of post-communist transition countries and other 
regions such as Latin American and Africa (Wayland 2002). This underscores the rationale of 
undertaking empirical analyses on the East European transition countries separately and not 
pooling them with countries in other regions.  
 
 
3. Research Design  
 
The empirical investigation seeks to explain the extent of market-economic reforms under-
taken by a country for any given year in the sample 1993-2006. This section discusses the 
choice of dependent variable(s) and explanatory political and economic variables.  
 
3.1. Dependent variables 
 
The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) publishes for all post-
communist transition countries indices of market-economic conformity covering different 
economic policy areas. The indices start in 1992 or earlier. The eight main indices indicate the 
progress of economic policy in the fields of price liberalisation, trade and foreign trade liber-
alisation, small scale and large scale privatisation, enterprise governance, competition and 
financial sector restructuring. All eight indices take values between 1 and 4.33. A value of 1 
denotes the level in tightly a state-controlled economy, while 4.33 denotes the “best practice” 
in western market economies. Thus, a higher index implies a higher degree of market-
conformity. The indices reflect the EBRD’s estimation of both extensiveness and effective-
ness of policy measures. For a detailed description on the methodology of the construction of 
the economic reform indices, see EBRD (2008).1 
 
In most estimations in this paper a simple average of the eight indices, labelled EBRD, will be 
used to represent the overall level of market-economic conformity. The variable ∆EBRD then 
denotes the year-to-year change in the overall index of market-economic conformity. A posi-
                                                 
1
 The indices can be downloaded from http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm. 
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tive value of ∆EBRD denotes economic reforms bringing the country in greater conformity 
with the best practice in market economies. Most of our empirical analyses seek to explain the 
extent of market-economic reforms, ∆EBRD. Notice that for the countries in the sample 
which started the reform process from a state of heavily state-control (i.e. with market con-
formity EBRD equal to 1), the variable of market-economic conformity EBRD at any given 
time is the accumulated reforms. 
 
Some estimations are undertaken using separate indices for various subcomponents of the 
EBRD index. In specific, one variable depicts the degree to which the practices of price set-
ting and trade conform to market-economic standards; changes in this variable denote liberali-
sation of prices and trade. One variable quantifies the degree of private ownership of small 
and large enterprises; changes in this variable are synonymous with privatisation. Finally, one 
variable captures the structure of the enterprise and financial sectors; changes in this variables 
measure the degree of enterprise and financial restructuring.  
 
 
It should be noticed that the variable of market-economic conformity, EBRD, as well as its 
subcomponents are bounded from below at 1 and from above 4.33. Reforms may, ceteris 
paribus, be “easier” to carry out when the level of market conformity is low and more difficult 
when the level of market conformity is high and the economy already conforms to market-
economic principles in most respects. Following this argument, we include the one-year 
lagged market-conformity variable as a control variable with the estimated coefficient ex-
pected to attain a negative sign. 
 
3.2. Independent variables 
 
Our independent variables include political and economic variables. Among political vari-
ables, we capture the effects of elections using three different variables namely, scheduled 
elections, mid-term elections and electoral cycle. The main reason for this division between 
scheduled and mid-term elections is that the exact timing of the midterm elections is sudden 
and unanticipated. Since the mid-term elections are unexpected to scheduled elections which 
are clearly expected, we would like to test how both these elections separately affect the re-
forms process. The scheduled elections variable is a dummy coded 1 for the years in which 
there was scheduled elections and 0 otherwise. It is noteworthy that we do not capture mid-
term election years here. The mid-term elections variable is also a dummy variable coded 1 if 
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there are mid-term elections in a given year and 0 otherwise. With respect to electoral cycle 
we code the variable as 1 if t is one year before a scheduled election year; 2 if t is two years 
before a scheduled election year; 3 if t is three years before a scheduled election year and 4 if t 
is four years before a scheduled election year in the respective country. On the scheduled 
election year, we code this variable as 0. This variable allow measuring how the temporal 
distance from a scheduled election year affects economic reforms process vis-à-vis an election 
year. Alternatively we also make use of another kind of electoral cycle to capture the same 
effect as a part of robustness check. This includes creating four separate dummy variables 
namely: 4-years before scheduled elections variables which take the value of 1 in the fourth 
year before every scheduled election year and 0 otherwise. The second dummy includes 3 
years before scheduled elections variable which takes the value of 1 in the third year before 
every scheduled election year and 0 otherwise. The third dummy variable is 2-years before 
elections variable include the value of 1 in the second year before every scheduled election 
year and 0 otherwise. Finally, 1-year before elections variable takes the value of 1 in the 1st 
year before every schedule election year and 0 otherwise. 
 
We also capture the effects of democracy on reforms by including the Polity IV regime type 
data constructed by Marshall & Jaggers (2002). We then follow Londregan & Poole (1996) 
by subtracting Polity IV’s autocracy score from it democracy score, giving rise to the final 
democracy variable used in this paper. The democracy variable ranges from -10 to +10, where 
-10 denotes a fully autocratic political system, +5 a partially democratic system, where +10 is 
highest possible score denoting the ideal democratic system. 
 
The economic reforms process may be facilitated if the ruling government controls the legis-
lature (Biglaiser & Brown, 2005; Ross, 2006). We capture this effect using the majority mar-
gin indicator in the Database of Political Institutions, cf. Beck et al. (2001). The majority 
margin is computed as the share of seats in parliament commanded by the ruling government. 
In some cases a score of 1 is given, which indicates that the government has full majority in 
parliament or that the country is a single party state.  
 
The ideology of the ruling government may also influence the economic reform agenda. We 
have three sets of groups’ viz., the right wings; left wings and centrists. Historically, the left 
wing parties like Communist Party have strong trade and industrial union associations. To 
control for ruling party ideology preference, we include a measure of ruling party ideology 
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that categorises whether the ruling party government is a left or right or centrists. For this 
purpose we formulate three different variables namely, left wing dummy; right wing dummy 
and centrists dummy, which takes the vale as 1 if the ruling party fall under any of the cate-
gory and 0 otherwise respectively. The data is obtained from Database of Political Institu-
tions, cf. Beck et al. (2001). 
 
Empirical studies have found significant negative impact of conflict on short term economic 
growth and development (Collier, 1998). Conflicts affect growth and development process in 
many ways. It leads to diversion of productive resources for unproductive purposes where the 
returns on such investments are nothing bit nil (Grossman & Kim, 1996). In an already crip-
pled state, conflicts increases the military spending which in turn crowds-out private and for-
eign investments creating huge negative fiscal impact and hamper the prospects of socioeco-
nomic development (Deger & Sen, 1983; Klein, 2004). Under these circumstances conflicts 
are expected to exert negative association on economic reforms. 
 
We also include a variable capturing the exposure of policymakers and voters to communism. 
We follow Chousa et al. (2005) and define the variable as the number of years under commu-
nism over the number of years after the break-down of communism. A high value of the vari-
able results from the country having spent long time under communist rule or only few years 
having elapsed since the end of communist rule in the country. A high value may thus reflect 
a lack of familiarity with democratic governance structures and market-economic principles. 
As such, the variable may also be interpreted as a measure of political “initial conditions” at 
any given year of the transition process.  
 
Among economic variables, we include the logarithm of GDP per capita to capture the effect 
of the economic development level on economic reforms. It may be expected that high in-
come transition countries will undertake more economic reforms, since these countries have 
better availability of administrative resources and the possibility to offset possible social and 
economic costs associated with reforms (Manzetti, 1999). Data for GDP per capita is taken 
from the World Development Indicators produced by the World Bank (WDI, 2007). .  
 
We also include three variables reflecting the current economic performance, namely the rate 
of GDP growth, the unemployment rate and a measure of the inflation rate. These variables 
may affect the “need” for economic reforms, the possibility space for reforms and the accep-
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tance of reforms in the public. The data for economic growth and unemployment is obtained 
from EBRD’s dataset of macroeconomic indicators. The inflation rate was extremely high in 
many transition economies during the early transition years. The consumer price inflation 
exhibits extremely large values as well as negative values in our sample, and we therefore use 
an inflation measure computed as log (100 + inflation rate). The data is obtained from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI, 2007).  
 
 
4. Empirical results and discussion  
 
The database comprises a fully balanced sample covering 26 transition economies for the pe-
riod 1992-2006. The countries in the sample are heterogeneous as they vary in size, political 
climate and the level of socioeconomic development. In order to address with possible coun-
try-specific unobserved heterogeneity we employ a two way random-effects specification 
(Hsiao, 1986). The pooled time-series cross-sectional data may exhibit heteroskedasticity and 
serial-correlation problems, although these do not bias the estimated coefficients as pooled 
regression analysis in itself is a more robust method for large sample consisting of cross sec-
tion and time series data. However, they often tend to cause biased standard errors for coeffi-
cients, producing invalid statistical inferences. To deal with these problems, Beck & Katz 
(1995) propose to retain POLS parameter estimates but replace the POLS standard errors with 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). They find that these estimates of sampling variability 
are very accurate, even in the presence of complicated panel error structures. Following oth-
ers, most of the analyses in this paper employ POLS two-way random effects regression with 
PCSE Cross-section weights. 
 
4.1. Full sample  
 
We begin the empirical analysis employing data for the entire sample of 26 transition econo-
mies for the period 1992-2006. The results of regression analyses seeking to explain the ex-
tent of economic reforms, ∆EBRD, are presented in Table 1 (models 1-8). The regression 
results do not bear out any effect of elections and electoral cycles on economic reforms in the 
context of the post-communist transition economies. Specifically, the results in model 1 show 
that national elections (including scheduled and mid-term) has no statistically significant ef-
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fect on the extent of economic reforms even in the absence of other explanatory variables than 
the lagged level of market-economic conformity, EBRD(-1). Moving further, in model 2 we 
divide the total elections into scheduled and mid-term elections, but the coefficients to both 
variables are statistically insignificant. In model 3 along with scheduled and mid-term elec-
tions, we also include the respective electoral cycles. As can be seen, neither the electoral 
cycles nor the elections dummies are statistically significant. We confirm our findings by re-
placing both the electoral cycles’ variables in model 4 with the distance from scheduled elec-
tions dummies. We still could not find any variable to be significant except one year before 
the scheduled elections which is positively significant.  
 
One interesting finding in all these four models is that effect of the lagged level of market-
economic conformity. We not only find a negative association with the economic reform vari-
able, but the effect is also consistently significant at the 1% confidence level. This inverse 
relationship suggests the case for convergence. This is arguably not surprising given the con-
struction of the index of market-conformity; the countries which have already obtained a high 
degree of market conformity have relatively limited potential to pursue further economic re-
forms. This may in particular be valid in the case of some of the transition countries from 
Central and East Europe which started the process of reforms early, while the upper constraint 
might be less binding for many of the CIS countries where the economies are still largely 
state-controlled. We return to this discussion in Subsection 4.2.  
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Table 1: Political determinants of economic reforms equation function 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE GMM-SYS 
Dependent Variable: ∆EBRD ∆EBRD ∆EBRD ∆EBRD ∆EBRD ∆EBRD ∆EBRD ∆EBRD 
Constant 0.176*** (0.0282) 
0.1896*** 
(0.0236) 
0.2014*** 
(0.0293) 
0.1296*** 
(0.0279) 
0.2326*** 
(0.0335) 
-0.1627* 
(0.0961) 
-0.166* 
(0.0945) 
-0.1736** 
(0.083) 
EBRD (t-1) -0.0321*** (0.0091) 
-0.0382*** 
(0.0092) 
-0.04*** 
(0.0092) 
-0.0258*** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0384** 
(0.0159) 
-0.0322* 
(0.0186) 
-0.0303 
(0.0184) 
-0.0271* 
(0.0157) 
National election -0.0005 (0.0070) 
.. .. .. .. .. 0.0073 
(0.0153) .. 
Scheduled election  .. -0.0029 (0.0152) 
-0.0116 
(0.0194) 
0.0267 
(0.0206) 
0.0022 
(0.0174) 
0.0067 
(0.0171) .. 
0.0079 
(0.0154) 
Scheduled elections cycle .. .. -0.0068 (0.0081) .. 
-0.0013 
(0.0075) 
-0.0006 
(0.0074) .. 
0.0056 
(0.0053) 
1 year before scheduled election .. .. .. 0.0426** (0.0212) 
.. .. .. .. 
2 years before scheduled election .. .. .. 0.0195 (0.0218) 
.. .. .. .. 
3 years before scheduled election .. .. .. 0.0504** (0.0221) 
.. .. .. .. 
4 years before scheduled election .. .. .. 0.0406 (0.028) 
.. .. .. .. 
Mid-term election  .. 0.02934 (0.0418) 
0.0364 
(0.0426) 
.. 0.0417 
(0.7465) 
0.0319 
(0.0397) 
.. .. 
Mid-term election cycle .. .. 0.0029 (0.0088) 
.. 0.0044 
(0.008) 
0.0066 
(0.0079) 
.. .. 
GDP growth (t-1) .. .. .. ..  -0.0005 (0.0009) 
-0.0005 
(0.0009) 
-0.0006 
(0.0008) 
Log GDP per capita (t-1) .. .. .. ..  0.0274*** (0.0099) 
0.027*** 
(0.0097) 
0.0256*** 
(0.0083) 
Democracy (t-1) .. .. .. .. 0.0071*** (0.0012) 
0.006*** 
(0.0012) 
0.006*** 
(0.0012) 
0.005*** 
(0.0011) 
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Unemployment (t-1) .. .. .. .. .. -0.0018** (0.0007) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0011 
(0.0007) 
Communist exposure (t-1) .. .. .. .. -0.4157*** 0.1095 
-0.3961*** 
(0.1019) 
-0.3978*** 
(0.1014) 
-0.4064*** 
(0.0933) 
Log (100 + inflation (t-1)) .. .. .. .. .. 0.0284** (0.0112) 
0.0287** 
(0.0111) 
0.0311*** 
(0.0096) 
Minimum majority (t-1) .. .. .. .. 0.0041 (0.0226) 
0.0302 
(0.0242) 
0.0304 
(0.0240) 
0.0256 
(0.0202) 
         Adjusted R2 0.0286 0.0414 0.0422 0.0264 0.1550 0.3007 0.2772 .. 
F-statistic 6.3358*** 6.2258*** 4.1987*** 2.6375** 9.3255*** 12.5773*** 13.6557*** .. 
Total no. of observations 364 364 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
AR1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.000 
AR2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.411 
J-statistic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 371.78** 
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In model 5, we control for traditional political determinants of economic reforms along with 
elections. We introduce variables namely, democracy, year of communist exposure and 
minimum majority which a government enjoys in the parliament in respective countries. 
Though we find positive sign for minimum majority variables, the coefficient did not attain 
statistical significance. We find a positive association of democracy with reforms. This result 
is consistent with Fidrmuc (2003) and Staehr (2006) who also find that democratisation led to 
market economic reforms. With respect to the measure of communist exposure we find a very 
strong negative effect on economic reforms. The coefficient to the variable is statistically sig-
nificant at 1% confidence level and the findings are robust across the models. The interesting 
point noteworthy in model 5 is that despite the inclusion of the political variables, both sched-
uled and mid-term elections and their respective electoral cycles remain statistically insignifi-
cant.  
 
In model 6, we also include other control variables which are largely related macroeconomic 
conditions. We find that increase in economic development (log GDP per capita) has a greater 
positive influence on change in reforms. Holding at its mean value, increase in log percapita 
GDP by its highest value (8.57%) would increase the change in economic reforms by 0.03% 
(see model 6, Table 1). However, we could not find any statistical significance for economic 
growth rate in any of our models. Consistent with the findings of Hayo (2004) on 14 transi-
tion economies, we also find that inflation is negatively associated with economic reforms. 
Along with the findings of Valev (2004), we find support for a negative impact of unemploy-
ment on economic reforms.  
 
The coefficient to the degree of democracy remains statistically significant and so does the 
coefficient to relative length of exposure to communist rule. Despite introducing full array of 
political and economic variables, we could not find support for the argument that elections 
(whether scheduled or mid-term) have affected reforms positively or negatively. In model 7, 
keeping the economic and political variables unchanged from model 6, we replace both the 
scheduled and mid-term elections variables with a simple national elections dummy which is 
coded 1 if a country had elections (irrespective of scheduled or mid-term) in a particular year 
and 0 otherwise. We find that this variable remains statistically insignificant, while the results 
pertaining to the political and economic variables remain robust. 
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The coefficient estimates in these models may likely to be biased. First, the relationship be-
tween economic reforms and economic growth and development can probably be bidirec-
tional. Meaning, if economic policy reforms cause good growth performance, then the reverse 
may also be true that good growth and development performance is also good for economic 
reforms. Second, there is also serious bidirectional causality between democracy and eco-
nomic reforms. Applying same logic, if economic policy reforms lead to promotion of democ-
racy, then the reverse may also be true that democracy may also act as a strong pillar is 
propagating economic reforms. A common statistical approach in dealing with causal and 
reverse causal bias is to use instrumental variables. It is always a matter of supposition 
whether the particular instrument variables selected would reduce biases or introduce new 
biases into the models. Also, instrument variable method under two stage least squares 
method can reduce the endogeneity bias but will not completely eliminate the problem. To 
tackle this we use GMM estimation of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) than simple GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), that exploits the stationarity restric-
tions and give more robust results. Moreover, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the differ-
enced GMM estimation has poor finite sample properties when the lagged levels of the series 
are weakly correlated with the subsequent first-differences. Therefore, the efficiency gains of 
using the system GMM over the may be higher. The validity of instruments that give a set of 
over-identifying restrictions has been verified with the standard Hansen test, which confirms 
that in all cases our set of instruments is valid. Furthermore, the AR(1) and AR(2) tests, that 
check the hypothesis of absence of serial correlation, are also presented. The standard errors 
of coefficients are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
The results of GMM in model 8 show some interesting trends. First, our estimate of conver-
gence variable (which is lagged value of economic reforms) is about one time higher than the 
one estimated by random effects specification in models 1 to 7. We observe that the random 
effects method gives an estimate of lagged reforms variable that is -0.038% and in some cases 
-0.04% higher than the one found in GMM estimations which is -0.027% (see model 8 in Ta-
ble 1). Next, the random effects model representing economic development treats correctly 
the correlated individual effects but fails to account for potential endogeneity. The estimated 
coefficient value of economic development is now smaller in GMM than the one estimated by 
random affects method. For example, the effect of economic development was 0.027% in 
model 6 and 7. This came down to 0.025% in model 8 using GMM (see Table 1). Similar 
conclusions are drawn for democracy variable. The GMM estimate of democracy is 0.005% 
 18 
compared to 0.006% in random effects (see models 6, 7 and 8). These results suggests that 
failing to account for endogeneity biases the coefficient values upwards and thereby exagger-
ating the claims of various key political and economic variables on reforms. The validity of 
the moment restrictions is checked by Hansen’s test fail to reject the null hypothesis. In light 
of these results, the moment conditions underlying the GMM estimation are supported. At the 
same time, the fact that there is evidence of first order but not second order autocorrelation 
implies that the models are correctly specified in levels, as expected.  
 
 
4.2. Sub-indices and sub-samples 
 
To assess the robustness and generality of the results above, we conducted a number of auxil-
iary regressions. The results are shown in Table 2. The first exercise entails using three differ-
ent sub-indices of the index of market conformity EBRD as described in Section 3 and then 
using changes in these indices as measures of reforms in different areas. The dependent vari-
able in model 9 is the liberalisation of prices and trade in any given year, the dependent vari-
able in model 10 is the small-scale and large-scale privatisation undertaken in any given 
years, while the dependent variable in model is the restructuring of enterprises and the finan-
cial sector in any given year. The results in all these three models show a strong sign of con-
vergence with the lagged levels in all cases attaining negative and statistically significant co-
efficients. The interesting findings in all these three models (9, 10, 11) is that none of the elec-
tions variable (viz., scheduled, mid-term of their respective electoral cycles) are significant, 
thus confirming our earlier findings using the overall economic reforms as dependent vari-
able. The results concerning the political and economic variables too remain largely un-
changed from the models presented in Table 1. The coefficients to democracy and economic 
development are strongly positive and statistically significant, while the coefficients to com-
munist exposure and unemployment are negative and significant.  
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Table 2: Different sub-specifications of economic reforms equation function 
Model 11 Model 9 Model 10 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
 
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE 
Dependent Variable: Liberalisation 
reforms  
Privatisation 
reforms 
Structural 
reforms ∆EBRD ∆EBRD ∆EBRD ∆EBRD 
Constant 0.2830 (0.1831 
-0.0613 
(0.1599) 
-0.4498***  
(0.1173) 
0.1177  
(0.1642) 
-0.1618  
(0.2082) 
-0.1780  
(0.1527) 
0.0353  
(0.1957) 
Scheduled election cycle 0.0028 (0.0114) 
-0.0183 
(0.0128) 
-0.0061  
(0.0102) 
-0.0013  
(0.0092) 
0.0072 
 (0.0106) 
0.0029 
(0.0151) 
-0.0025  
(0.0038) 
Scheduled election 0.0463* (0.0253) 
-0.0124 
(0.0282) 
0.017 
(0.0238) 
-0.0018  
(0.0244) 
0.0139 
 (0.0216) 
0.0097  
(0.0305) 
-0.0039  
(0.0091) 
Mid-term election cycle 0.017 (0.0124) 
0.0130 
(0.0137) 
0.0216** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0039  
(0.0102) 
0.0022  
(0.0115) 
0.0066  
(0.015) 
9.63E-05  
(0.0044) 
Mid-term Elections 0.0523 (0.0539) 
0.0351 
(0.0608) 
0.0006  
(0.0509) 
0.1566** 
(0.0648) 
-0.0576 
(0.0444) 
0.0301 
(0.0608) 
0.0335 
(0.0245) 
GDP growth (t-1) -1.34E-05  (0.0015) 
-1.79E-05 
(0.0016) 
-0.0004  
(0.0012) 
0.0013  
(0.0011) 
-0.0026 
(0.0019) 
2.50E-05  
(0.0014) 
-0.0021** 
(0.001) 
Log GDP per capita (t-1) -0.0174 (0.014) 
0.0275* 
(0.0156) 
0.0803*** 
(0.0143) 
-0.0089  
(0.0144) 
0.0661***  
(0.0212) 
0.02712 
(0.0166) 
0.0145  
(0.0114) 
Democracy (t-1) 0.0093*** (0.0023) 
0.0097*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0062*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0047*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0028  
(0.0025) 
0.0072*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0032*  
(0.0016) 
Unemployment (t-1) -0.0014 (0.001) 
-0.0018 
(0.0013) 
-0.0035*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0025** 
(0.0012) 
-0.002*  
(0.0011) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0004  
(0.0009) 
Communist exposure (t-1) -0.1414 (0.1231) 
-0.5739*** 
(0.1413) 
-0.1337 
(0.1468) 
-0.5621** 
(0.2378) 
-0.1882 
(0.1278) 
-0.2096 
(0.2805) 
-0.1101  
(0.1065) 
Log (100 + inflation (t-1)) 0.0182 (0.0188) 
0.047** 
(0.02) 
0.0168 
(0.0142) 
0.0297** 
(0.0149) 
0.0167 
(0.0205) 
0.031** 
(0.0153) 
0.0063 
(0.0381) 
Minimum majority (t-1) -0.0022 (0.04) 
0.014 
(0.0402) 
0.0328 
(0.0300 
0.0324 
(0.0276) 
-0.0735 
(0.054) 
0.0323  
(0.0383) 
-0.0091 
(0.0221) 
Price setting and trade (t-1) -0.1231*** (0.0316) .. 
.. .. .. .. .. 
Private ownership (t-1) .. -0.0766*** (0.0233) 
.. .. .. .. .. 
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Enterprises and finance (t-1) .. .. -0.115*** (0.026) 
.. .. .. .. 
EBRD (t-1) .. .. .. -0.0128 (0.027) 
-0.1178*** 
(0.0288) 
-0.0423 
(0.0332) 
-0.0382** 
(0.0186) 
Adjusted R2 0.1701 0.3078 0.1945 0.2160 0.4094 0.1595 0.0245 
F-statistic 7.8572*** 14.4525*** 8.3038*** 4.8341*** 12.2624*** 4.2733*** 1.3244*** 
Total No. of Observations 364 364 364 168 196 208 156 
Number of countries 26 26 26 CIS Non-CIS 26 (93-00) 26 (00-06) 
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Second, we split the sample into two parts. The first set includes the CIS countries (plus 
Mongolia) and the other set includes the rest of the transition countries. The dependent vari-
able in this case would be change in economic reforms variable. The results are presented in 
model 12 and 13 (see Table 2). Again, these results conform our earlier findings with no ef-
fect of elections. We find that none of elections variables are significant with the exception of 
mid-term elections in the case of CIS countries.  
 
Amongst the political variables, we find that the effect of democracy is statistically significant 
only in the CIS countries. This may partly be explained by the democracy variable exhibiting 
relatively more variability for the CIS countries than for the western transition countries 
which in most cases democratised very fast. The coefficient to the variable depicting the ex-
posure to communist rule is negative and broadly of same magnitude in both cases, but it is 
only statistically in the regression covering the CIS countries.  
 
One interesting finding noteworthy is the effect of lagged economic reforms variable. We 
now return to the discussion on convergence in the reforms process. Earlier we highlighted 
that there is evidence of reforms convergence in these countries but cautioned that it may not 
be the case for all the countries in the sample. These arguments are supported by the results of 
models 12 and 13 in Table 2. We find that lagged reforms variable is statistically insignificant 
in the case of the CIS countries, possibly reflecting that the majority of the CIS countries have 
undertaken only limited economic reforms. Countries like Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in 
2006 scored around 2 or less on EBRD index of market conformity. While, many non-CIS 
countries have moved up the ladder with significant reforms policy changes over the last two 
decades.  
 
Finally, we also divided the sample by time period. We ran results for all the 26 countries for 
the period 1993-2000 and 2001-2006. The results with respect to elections remain statistically 
insignificant in both the models (see models 14 and 15). The coefficients to the lagged re-
forms variable are negative and of broadly the same magnitude in the two periods, although it 
is only statistically significant during the later period (2001-2006). The economic variables 
loose both statistical and economic significance in the later period, possibly reflecting the less 
volatile economic developments in this period. The level of democracy remains a significant 
determinant in the reforms process in both the periods.  
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5. Final comments 
 
The study have considered the political determinants of economic reforms in the case of 26 
transition countries during the period 1993-2006. We have used different econometric panel 
data techniques to explain the relationship between a range of explanatory factors and the 
extent of economic reforms at the given year. The bulk of estimations are based a random-
effects specification which seeks to take into account possible country specific unobserved 
heterogeneity; GMM estimations are used to take into account the potential endogeneity of 
the explanatory variables.  
 
Using cross-sectional time series data on elections and EBRD’s economic reforms index, it is 
demonstrated that economic reforms process responds to a range of political and macroeco-
nomic factors. Prominent among them include: democracy, economic development, length of 
exposure to communist rule, governments with right-wing ideology, inflation and unemploy-
ment. While there is a strong relationship between the aforementioned variables, we could not 
find any statistical significant results in the case of elections, either scheduled or mid-term. 
Similarly, whether the government has commanded a majority of seats in parliament seems 
unimportant. The reform process seems to exhibit convergence although this feature is most 
prominent for the group of CIS countries, possibly because the economic reform process has 
been much more rapid in the Western transition countries than in the CIS countries.  
 
When we employed sub-indices of economic reforms separately (liberalisation, privatisation 
and structural reforms), most of the results from the overall reform estimations remained 
valid. When we divided the sample of countries into CIS and non-CIS countries, it emerged 
that there were differences in the relative importance of different factors. We also divided the 
sample years into early reforms years (1993-2000) and late reforms years (2000-2006). The 
results mostly remain unchanged amongst all the models.  
 
The paper leaves some issues unresolved. We have sought to address possible the possible 
correlation between different explanatory factors by sub-dividing the sample into different 
sub-samples. Still, more work needs to be done to understand more fully the interrelationships 
between different explanatory factors. One important objective would be to distinguish more 
clearly between the effects of initial political and economic conditions and the effects of the 
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on-going political and economic developments. This may entail the use of interaction terms, 
factorisation of the explanatory variable or estimation of systems explaining several variables 
simultaneously. The conceptual and econometric challenges of such analyses are sizable but 
would enlarge our understand of the unique historical experiment of simultaneous political 
and economic in almost 30 countries.  
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Transition economies under study 
Countries grouped as CIS countries 
Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Moldova 
Mongolia Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan 
 
Countries grouped as non-CIS countries 
Albania Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia 
Lithuania Macedonia Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2: Data Sources 
Variable Data Source 
Economic Growth Rate  World Development Indicators (2007), World Bank 
Economic Development World Development Indicators (2007), World Bank 
Democracy  POLITY IV (Marshall & Jaggars 2002) 
Unemployment  EBRD database (2008) 
Communist exposure  Authors’s own construction (see text) 
Inflation  World Development Indicators (2007), World Bank 
Minimum majority  DPI (2007) 
Elections variables Authors’s own construction based on DPI (2007) 
EBRD EBRD database (2008) 
 
 
Annex 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation 
No. of 
countries 
Scheduled election cycle 1.89 2 4 0 1.01 26 
Midterm election cycle 1.92 2 4 0 1 26 
1 Year before elections 0.2 0 1 0 0.4 26 
2 Years before elections 0.19 0 1 0 0.39 26 
3 Years before elections 0.18 0 1 0 0.38 26 
4 Years before elections 0.07 0 1 0 0.25 26 
Economic reform index 2.48 1 3.9 0.72 2.19 26 
GDP growth  2.12 4.25 34.5 -44.9 9.02 26 
Log GDP per capita 8.57 8.77 10.07 6.78 0.82 26 
Democracy 3.82 7 10 -9 6.45 26 
Unemployment rate 10.01 8.7 37.7 0.1 7.69 26 
Communist exposure 0.2 0.19 0.44 0.05 0.09 26 
Inflation  223.7 10.63 15606.5 -8.52 955.94 26 
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Annex 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
Scheduled 
elections 
Mid-term 
elections 
Mid-term 
election 
cycle 
Scheduled 
election 
cycle 
GDP 
growth 
Log GDP 
per capita 
Scheduled elections 1.000      
Mid-term elections -0.034 1.000     
Mid-term election cycle -0.483 0.102 1.000    
Scheduled election cycle -0.307 0.106 0.683 1.000   
GDP growth rate -0.050 -0.016 0.066 0.016 1.000  
Log GDP per capita 0.047 0.011 -0.073 -0.060 0.187 1.000 
Log (100 + inflation) -0.049 -0.029 -0.027 -0.015 -0.355 -0.166 
Democracy 0.058 0.007 -0.083 -0.105 -0.004 0.501 
Unemployment 0.003 0.045 -0.077 -0.121 0.115 0.258 
Communist exposure 0.038 -0.017 -0.005 -0.031 0.506 0.488 
Majority margin -0.032 0.046 -0.027 -0.066 0.073 -0.028 
ERBD (t-1) 0.097 0.007 -0.033 -0.019 0.180 0.617 
 
Log (100  + 
inflation) Democracy 
Unemploy-
ment 
Communist 
exposure 
Majority 
margin EBRD (t-1) 
Log (100 + inflation) 1.000      
Democracy -0.075 1.000     
Unemployment -0.103 0.156 1.000    
Initial conditions -0.286 0.351 0.103 1.000   
Majority margin 0.009 -0.002 0.313 0.017 1.000  
Reforms (t-1) -0.253 0.565 0.055 0.632 -0.041 1.000 
 
